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McGEEHAN v. BUNCH-INVALIDATING
STATUTORY TORT IMMUNITY THROUGH A NEW
APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

In 1975 the New Mexico Supreme Court in McGeehan v. Bunch'
invalidated New Mexico's forty-year old automobile guest statute. In
doing so, the court relied on the principle that one does not have to
be a paying guest in order to recover for negligently inflicted injury.
The adoption of this principle may have far-reaching effects on the
general tort law of New Mexico.
McGeehan had sued Bunch for injuries she sustained as a result of
Bunch's alleged negligence in driving the car in which she was a guest.
The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeals, dismissed McGeehan's suit on the ground that the automobile guest statute denied
nonpaying guests a remedy for injuries resulting from ordinary negligence. 2 The supreme court granted certiorari to determine whether
the statute unconstitutionally denied equal protection by distinguishing between paying and nonpaying automobile guests. The court held
that the statute did violate the equal protection guarantees of both
the federal and the state constitutions3 because the classifications
drawn on the basis of compensation bore no "substantial and
rational relation to the statute's purposes of protecting the hospi4
tality of the host driver and of preventing collusive lawsuits."
The constitutionality of New Mexico's automobile guest statute
had been sustained three times.' The decision to invalidate it at this
time reflects significant new trends in the attitude of the court. First,
the court has recognized that circumstances with regard to liability
1. 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
2. The automobile guest statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (Repl. 1972), provided:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for
damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard for
the rights of others.
3. N.M. Const. art. II, § 18.
4. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 314, 540 P.2d at 244.
5. Cortez v. Martinez, 76 N.M. 506, 445 P.2d 383 (1968); Mwijage v. Kipkemei, 85 N.M.
360, 512 P.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1973); Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696, 437 P.2d 157 (Ct.
App. 1967) cert. denied, Jan. 31, 1968. The guest statute was altered on constitutional
grounds by judicial decision in 1964. See note 20, infra.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

insurance have changed considerably since the guest statute was enacted. Second, in examining the validity of the statute in the context
of modem conditions, the court applied a new federal standard of
equal protection analysis and demonstrated its willingness to take an
interventionist position on minimal scrutiny grounds. Third, the
opinion clearly disapproves of classifications which deny a remedy
for negligently inflicted injury on the basis of compensation. This
Note will examine these three elements of the McGeehan opinion.
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES

As automobile travel became more prevalent during the early part
of this century, most American jurisdictions established the rule that
private owners and operators of automobiles owed their passengers a
duty of reasonable care in the operation of their vehicles. A small
number of jurisdictions, however, applied the doctrine of gratuitous
bailees to automobile drivers and thus varied the duty owed by
drivers to their passengers on the basis of their status as paying or
nonpaying guests.6 Between 1927 and 1939 twenty-eight states codified the minority rule7 in automobile guest statutes which allowed
nonpaying guests to recover only for injuries resulting from some
aggravated misconduct on the part of their host drivers.
The rise of the guest statutes during the 1930's has been attributed
to two factors. Although automobile travel was increasing during this
period, automobile liability insurance was just appearing.' The economic conditions of the Depression made sharing rides a necessity
for many people and contributed to an increase in the number of
hitch-hikers. There was considerable ill feeling against hitch-hikers as a
result of a few highly publicized robberies and murders. 9 Within this
context, legislatures felt it was reasonable to encourage hospitality
by a means which would protect drivers from the inequitable burden
6. Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap to the
Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 99, 103 [hereinafter cited as
Constitutionality of Guest Statutes]; Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest
Statutes, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 659, 661-3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Status of Guest
Statutes]. The origin of the minority rule has been attributed to Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228
Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917) (overruled by statute), where the English common law rule
of gratuitious bailment of chattels was first applied to automobile drivers.
7. Status of Guest Statutes, supra note 5, at 659, 665.
8. Comment, Review of the Past, Preview of the Future: The Viability of Automobile
Guest Statutes, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 709, 711 (1973).
9. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 287, 287 (1958).
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 180, § 34 (4th ed. 1971), has noted, "[in legislative hearings there is frequent mention of the hitch-hiker, who gets little sympathy. This
writer once found a hitch-hiker case, but has mislaid it. He has been unable to find
another."

Summer 1977]

EQUAL PROTECTION ANAL YSIS

of bearing all the costs of automobile accidents'

0

and prevent "law-

suits instituted by ungrateful guests who have benefited from a free

ride." 1

1

The more important factor in the rise of the guest statutes was the
effective lobbying of insurance companies.' 2 It was reasoned that
nonpaying guests are usually closely related to the host driver, and
because of this relationship, "the driver may falsely admit liability in
order for his guest to recover from the driver's insurance company." 1 3 On the basis of this reasoning, insurance companies convinced legislators that the elimination of this type of lawsuit would

result in lower automobile insurance rates.'"
No guest statute has been enacted since 1939, but several state
legislatures have repealed their statutes.' s In 1973 the California
Supreme Court in Brown v. Merlo' 6 became the first state court to
hold an automobile guest statute unconstitutional. The California
decision was quickly followed by five other state court decisions,' 7
including McGeehan, all of which have considered changes in the

availability of liability insurance as a major factor in invalidating the
statutes.
In examining the statute's purpose of promoting hospitality, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in McGeehan pointed out that, while at
one time it may have been inequitable to have the host bear the
burden of his negligence, the trend toward mandatory liability insurance for automobile owners had shifted that burden to the host's
insurance company and to the general motoring public. With respect

to the state's interest in protecting the host from ingratitude, the
court was unable to find any element of ingratitude in suing one's
1
host's insurance company. 8
10. Note, Guest Statutes and the Common Law Categories:An Inseparable Duality?, 51
Notre Dame Law. 467, 469 (1976).
11. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 864, 506 P.2d 212, 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 394
(1973).
12. Status of Guest Statutes, supra note 5, at 664.
13. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 312, 540 P.2d at 242.
14. Id. at 313, 540 P.2d at 243.
15. Connecticut, the first state to enact an automobile guest statute, repealed its statute
in 1937. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 313, 540 P.2d at 243. Vermont repealed its guest statute in
1969 and Florida in 1972. Status of Guest Statutes, supra note 5, at 660.
16. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). In Brown, as inMcGeehan,
California's guest statute was held to violate both the federal and the state constitutions.
17. Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Thompson v. Hagan, 96
Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974);
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974)rehearingdenied, May 24, 1974.
18. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 312, 540 P.2d at 242. The court pointed out also that the
enactment of the Financial Responsibility Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 64-24-42 et seq. (Repl.
1972), had established "a policy for protection of the public involved in motor vehicle
accidents." Although the court may have intended to imply that this policy was in conflict
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In discussing the prevention of collusion rationale the court noted
that, in contrast to predictions by insurance companies, the enactment of an automobile guest statute did not necessarily result in
lower insurance rates. In Connecticut, for example, insurance rates
had not decreased after the enactment of an automobile guest statute
in 1927, nor had rates increased after the statute's repeal ten years
later.1 9
It is significant that the McGeehan court discussed changing circumstances only with regard to liability insurance while other state
courts invalidating their guest statutes have considered judicial and
legislative changes in general tort doctrine as well. 2" This is one
indication of the degree of importance which the court placed on the
interest affected by the statute. It also demonstrates the innovativeness of the decision in terms of general New Mexico tort law. More
significant is the fact that the McGeehan court, and other state
courts invalidating their automobile guest statutes, have judged the
rationality of these statutes in terms of contemporary circumstances
rather than circumstances which existed at the time the statutes were
enacted. This analysis was made possible by the application of a new
standard of equal protection review.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In 1967 the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Romero v. Tilton2
sustained the constitutionality of the distinction made by the guest
statute between owner drivers who were protected from liability to
nonpaying guests for their ordinary negligence and non-owner drivers
who were not extended this immunity. 2 The federal equal protecwith the policy of the automobile guest statute in denying a part of the public a remedy for
ordinary negligence, it did so only indirectly.
19. Id. at 313, 540 P.2d at 243.
20. The Brown v. Merlo decision, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973), on which McGeehan relied heavily, was founded in part on the abolition in California of common law categories with status determining liability, leaving automobile guests
in a unique position from guests in other situations. Both Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d at
__
331 N.E.2d at 728, and Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho at
-,
523 P.2d at 1368,
relied in part on the reasoning of their earlier rejection of the doctrine of charitable immunity. In Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d at 780, the court stated that North Dakota's recent
enactment of comparative negligence was incompatible with the retention of an automobile
guest statute.
21. 78 N.M. 696, 437 P.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1967) cert. denied, Jan. 31, 1968.
22. As originally enacted, New Mexico's guest statute provided that nonpaying guests
could not recover from either owners or operators of motor vehicles for injuries resulting
from ordinary negligence. In Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964) rehearing denied, Feb. 19, 1965, the court declared that the statute was void as to non-owner
drivers for failure of the title of the statute to expressly include them as required by Article
IV, Section 16, of the New Mexico Constitution.
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tion standard followed by the court provided in part that in determining the reasonableness of a classification drawn by a statute, "if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed." 2 3
The formula used by the court in Romero represents one of two
completely disparate standards of equal protection review which
have been applied by the United States Supreme Court in a strongly
consistent pattern. Under this two-tier approach the Court first
determines whether a suspect category 2 4 or a fundamental interest 2 I is present in the statutory scheme under attack. If so, the
Court applies a strict scrutiny test. In all other cases minimal scrutiny
or a restrained review is utilized. 2 6 The initial selection of the test to
be applied has usually been determinative of the outcome of the
decision.
The test under strict scrutiny places on the state the unsurmountable burden of proving not only that its legislation is necessary for
the achievement of a compelling state interest, 2 7 but also that the
means selected are the least restrictive alternative. 2 8 When applying
strict scrutiny the Court has consistently found the classification
challenged to be violative of equal protection. 2 9 In contrast, the test
for minimal scrutiny, characterized by the Romero opinion, in effect
provides no review at all because it creates an almost irrebutable
presumption of constitutionality. 3
It neither restricts the state's
choice of alternative means nor condemns means which imperfectly
23. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (emphasis added),
quoted in Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. at 700, 437 P.2d at 161.
24. Suspect categories include those based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
national ancestry, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage, Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
25. Fundamental interests include specific constitutional guarantees like the right to
counsel in a criminal trial, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as well as guarantees
which can be implied from the Constitution such as the right to procreate, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and the right of privacy, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 310, 540 P.2d at 240.
27. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 477 n.7 (1972); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964).
28. See McLaughlin v.Florida, 379 U.S. at 196.
29. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther's Model]. In fact, the only case in which the Court has ever
sustained a statute reviewed under the strict scrutiny test is Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
30. Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute Exemplar and a
Proposalfor Comparative Negligence, 21 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 1566, 1571 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JudicialActivism in Tort Reform].
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effectuate the state's goals so long as there is a rational relation
between the classifications drawn by the statute and a valid state
purpose. 3 ' In determining the rationality of statutes the Court has
often relied on its imagination to hypothesize not only the relationship between classifications and state purposes, but also what purposes the legislature may have considered in enacting statutes.3 2
Using this rigid two-tier approach, the interventionist Warren
Court had succeeded in applying strict scrutiny to a wide range 3of
state activity by enlarging the scope of fundamental interests. 1
More recently the Court has shown a dissatisfaction with this tactic.
The result has been the application of a more vigorous minimal scrutiny which has allowed the Court to intervene in state activity without resorting to strict scrutiny and thus to avoid a further expansion
of the list of fundamental interests.3 4 Constitutional scholar Gerald
Gunther has defined the characteristics of this new model for equal
protection analysis on the basis of a study of fifteen equal protection
cases decided by the Burger Court during the 1971 term and also on
the basis of his perception of what is compatible with the Court's
position of modest interventionism. 3 I Gunther's model suggests a
means-focused analysis which would avoid the value-laden criticism
characteristic of strict scrutiny by concentrating on legislative means
rather than ends. It establishes the test that legislative means must
substantially further legislative ends.3 6
It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative
purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of materials that are offered
to the Court, rather than resorting
to rationalizations created by
3
perfunctory judicial hypothesizing. 7
The McGeehan court expressly acknowledged the new equal protection standard defined by Gunther as one which recognizes "the
existence of substantial claims under the equal protection clause on
minimal rationality grounds and has, to some extent, blurred the
distinction between strict and minimal scrutiny." 3 8 The court cites
31. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) (dissenting
opinion); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
32. Gunther's Model, supra note 29, at 21. See Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
33. Gunther'sModel, supra note 29, at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 12, 48.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 21.
38. 88 N.M. at 310, 540 P.2d at 240.
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the current federal constitutional standard from Reed v. Reed,3 9 a
case which was characterized by Gunther as representative of the
new invigorated minimal scrutiny. The Reed standard provides:
The Equal Protection Clause .. . deny[s] to States the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." 40
Although this formula is not a new one, 4 ' it has under traditional
minimal scrutiny been applied with an extreme deference to legislative authority. 4 2 Under the new approach the New Mexico Supreme
Court has attempted to make a realistic appraisal of the.relationship
between the classifications drawn by the automobile guest statute
and its acknowledged purposes of promoting hospitality and preventing collusive lawsuits.
In discussing the promotion of hospitality, the court defined two
rationales which have been advanced in its support. The first is the
assumption that those who pay are entitled to a higher standard of
care than those who do not. The court recognized that this principle
had been accepted as applicable to common carriers, but found it
inapplicable to guests in private automobiles. Emphasizing the lack
of any legal principle which "dictates that one must pay for the right
of protection from negligently inflicted injury," the court concluded:
[T] he classification fails not because it draws some distinction between paying and nonpaying guests, but because it penalizes nonpaying guests by depriving them completely of protection from
ordinary negligence.... No matter how laudable the State's interest
in promoting hospitality, it is irrational to reward generosity by
allowing the host to abandon ordinary care and by denying to nonpaying guests the common law remedy for negligently inflicted
injury. 4 3
Furthermore, the court found that the statute treated nonpaying
guests in the host's car differently from guests in other cars. The
39. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
40. Id. at 75-6, quoted in McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 310, 540 P.2d at 240.
41. The ReedCourt cites as authority for this standard Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
42. See State v. Thompson, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370 (1930).
43. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 311, 540 P.2d at 241.

258
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court could find no rational basis for allowing the host to be less
vigilant for his own guest than he was for similarly-situated guests in
another person's vehicle.4 4
The second rationale supporting the promotion of hospitality is
the assumption that it is the "epitome of ingratitude" to sue one's
host for negligence.4 As previously discussed the court found that
whatever relationship may have existed in the past between the classifications drawn by the statute and protection against ingratitude
had been altered by the widespread availability of liability insurance.
The court went even a step further to question whether protection
against ingratitude was ever a permissible state interest.4 6
The court acknowledged the legitimacy of the state's interest in
preventing collusive lawsuits. It reasoned, however, that compensation is not the element which distinguishes collusive from noncollusive actions. The court pointed out that the classification for nonpaying guests was overinclusive in including many persons who may
have legitimate causes of action and persons like hitch-hikers who
have no relationship with the host driver. The court found it arbitrary to do away with lawsuits for a certain class of persons merely
because some among them may institute fraudulent suits. The classification was found to be underinclusive because many paying guests
may have a close relationship with the driver and thus have an equal
opportunity to collude on the issue of negligence. Furthermore, since
those who might collude on negligence can just as easily collude on
whether compensation was paid, the statute did little to prevent
4 7
collusion.
It is clear that the court has applied an equal protection analysis
which combines the features of strict and minimal scrutiny as it
announced at the outset of the opinion. The analysis is similar to
the model described by Gunther in that it has invalidated a statute
without resorting to strict scrutiny.4 8 The court's demonstration of
the lack of impact on insurance rates, the underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness of the classifications, and the lack of relationship
between collusion and compensation are all compatible with the
model's focus on a realistic appraisal of the actual effects of legisla44. Id. The California court in Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 867, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 396, used this same example to illustrate the different treatment afforded similarly
situated persons. Both courts ignore the fact that since the purpose of the statute is to foster
the hospitality of the host driver, nonpaying guests who avail themselves of that hospitality
can easily be distinguished from pedestrians and passengers in other cars who have not.
45. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 311-2, 540 P.2d at 241-2.
46. Id. at 312, 540 P.2d at 242.
47. Id. at 312-3, 540 P.2d at 242-3.
48. Gunther'sModel, supra note 27, at 18.
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tive means. The court's discussion of how liability insurance has
altered the rationality of protecting the host driver from ingratitude
is also consistent with Gunther's model.
In general, however, the court's discussion of the hospitality rationale incorporates many of the value-laden conclusions which Gunther's model would avoid. 4 9 Not only does the court question the
wisdom of the state's protection against ingratitude, the focus of the
opinion is clearly more on the irrationality of the classification itself
than it is on the relationship between the classification and the purpose it was intended to advance.' 0
In this respect the court's analysis is similar to what Justice Marshall has labeled a "reasoned" approach to equal protection. According to Justice Marshall the United States Supreme Court has used this
approach to apply a "spectrum of standards" varying the degree of
scrutiny on the basis of the "constitutional and societal importance
of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness
of the basis on which the particular classification is drawn."' ' Unlike Gunther's model, Justice Marshall's approach necessarily entails
an evaluation of legislative ends because it would have the court
balance the interest adversely affected by the classification against
the state's interest in achieving the goals of the statute.' 2
The McGeehan court has in fact balanced these interests and concluded that no matter how laudable the state's interest in promoting
hospitality, it cannot outweigh the right of nonpaying guests to have
49. Id. at 21.
50. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 311, 540 P.2d at 241.
51. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 98-99 (dissenting opinion). It is interesting to note that both Justice Marshall and Gunther relied on many of the same cases decided
in the 1971 term for support of their respective models. One author has suggested that the
courts in Brown, Johnson v. Hassett, Henry v. Buader and Thompson v. Hagan, although
citing to Gunther's model, were actually applying the approach defined by Justice Marshall.
Constitutionalityof Guest Statutes, supra note 5, at 120-1.
52. See generally San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 98-110. A recent Supreme
(1976), would indicate that
U.S. __
Court decision, Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, __
the Court has taken an approach similar to that described by Justice Marshall, at least in
cases involving classifications based on gender. Such classifications have not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court as suspect. In Craig v. Boren the Court examined an Oklahoma
liquor statute which distinguished between males and females on the basis of age. The Court
determined that "[t] o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases established that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be subBy
stantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 457, ___ U.S. __.
establishing that the state must show an important rather than a valid state purpose, the
Court has in effect applied a stricter scrutiny than would have been applied under the
traditional minimal scrutiny test. It has done so on the basis of the nature of the classification being drawn. Therefore, it would seem that the New Mexico Supreme Court, while not
following precisely the test established by Gunther, has remained within the limits of the
standard which the Supreme Court has ultimately applied in certain situations.
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a remedy for ordinary negligence.5 3 Gunther's new model for equal
protection analysis provided the means by which the court could, in
keeping with current federal standards, intervene to protect this
interest. The fact that the court went beyond the scope of the model
illustrates the degree of importance it placed on the principle that
one should not have to pay for the right of protection against ordinary negligence.
IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY ON THE BASIS OF STATUS
In determining that the hospitality rationale did not justify the
distinction between paying and nonpaying guests, the McGeehan
court followed closely the analysis made by the California court in
Brown v. Merlo. 4 The McGeehan court, however, omitted any discussion of one of the primary factors in the California court's rejection of the hospitality rationale.
The court in Brown considered the distinction made by the statute
between automobile guests and guests in other situations as well as
the distinction made between paying and nonpaying automobile
guests. The court reasoned that equal protection analysis requires the
court to go beyond an examination of the specific statute under
attack in order to "judge the enactment's operation against the background of other legislative, administrative and judicial directives
which govern the legal rights of similarly situated persons."' I California has abolished the common law doctrine which distinguished
the duty owed by landowners to persons on their property on the
basis of their status as invitee, licensee or trespasser. Furthermore,
California Civil Code section 1714 provides that "[elvery one is
responsible.., for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person."
The court concluded on the basis of these factors that "[u]nder
current California law, . . . recipients of hospitality may generally
demand that their hosts exercise due care so as not to injure
5
them." 6
In order to demonstrate that the guest statute's purpose of fostering hospitality did not justify a lower standard of care for nonpaying
automobile guests, the court restated the reasoning which had supported the abolition in California of common law doctrines which
had provided a lower standard of care for other classes of persons.5 7
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

88 N.M. at 311, 540 P.2d at 241.
8 Cal. 3d at 864-72, 506 P.2d at 218-24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394-400.
Id. at 862, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
Id. at 865, 506 P.2d at 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
One commentator has suggested that the application of "common law determina-
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In striking down the invitee-licensee-trespasser categories in Rowland
v. Christian,s8 the court had stressed the irrationality of those classifications in contemporary society. It found that "[a] man's life and
limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss
less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come
upon the land of another without permission or with permission but
without a business purpose."

9

More importantly, the Rowland

court concluded that "[r] easonable people 6do
0 not ordinarily vary
matters."
such
upon
dependent
conduct
their
California has also abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity.
The premise of this doctrine, that the recipients of the generosity of
charitable institutions cannot properly demand protection from ordinary negligence, is similar to that of automobile guest statutes.6 1 In
Malloy v. Fong62 and Silva v. Providence Hospital63 the court had
rejected the rationality of promoting charity by denying its beneficiaries a right to protection from negligently inflicted injuries. The
court had reasoned that persons who avail themselves of the services
of such institutions cannot realistically be said to have consented to
the institution's immunity from liability.6
The Brown court found the reasoning of these cases clearly applicable to the guest statute. In the court's view it demonstrated the
irrationality of assuming "that if a recipient of generosity is permitted recovery for negligent injuries the cause of 'ingratitude' will
be served or the cause of 'hospitality' will be plundered." 6 S The
McGeehan opinion incorporated these conclusions without enunciating the reasons behind them.
Furthermore, the McGeehan court could not demonstrate support
for these conclusions in New Mexico law. In his dissent in McGeehan
Justice Oman pointed out that the court's reliance on Brown was
clearly misplaced. Not only does New Mexico retain many of the
common law classifications rejected by the California courts, it has as
tions of reasonableness to determine the rationality of statutory classification[s]" makes
Brown an example of bad constitutional law. Nevertheless, the same author states that
Brown represents sound tort policy. Judicial Activism in Tort Reform, supra note 30, at
1569, 1585.
58. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
59. Id. at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104, quoted in Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 870,
506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
60. 69 Cal. 2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104, quoted in Brown, 8 Cal. 3d
at 870, 506 P.2d at 222-3, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398-9.
61. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
62. 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (195 1), rehearingdenied, June 23, 1951.
63. 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939), rehearingdenied, Jan. 25, 1940.
64. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
65. Id. at 872, 406 P.2d at 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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well an airplane guest statute6 6 and a "Good Samaritan" Act 6 7
which protects from liability for ordinary negligence6 those who perform emergency care services without remuneration. 8
The New Mexico court may certainly be criticized for its failure to
support with adequate discussion the legal conclusions it draws,
especially in light of the particular standard it chose to apply. However, the lack of such a presentation does not in itself negate the
validity of the result. Under Brown it seems clear that withdrawing
protection from ordinary negligence never substantially furthers a
state's goal of fostering hospitality. 6 9 Therefore, the retention in
New Mexico law of similarly based classifications is irrelevant. The
classifications drawn by the statute are irrational because they do not
meet the test of substantially furthering the state's goals and not
because of the existence of any legal principle which dictates that
one should not have to pay for the right of protection against ordinary negligence. Such a principle did not exist in New Mexico before
the McGeehan decision.
In one respect, while Brown v. Merlo may be viewed as one of the
last stages in a progressive eradication of common law and statutory
status-based classifications in California, the McGeehan opinion may
well represent the first step in a similar process in New Mexico. It has
been suggested that in light of Brown's reliance on Rowland v. Christian and its rejection of status determining liability, those courts
which have followed Brown will at the least be required to abolish
their state's invitee-licensee-trespasser classifications. 7" This may
prove true in New Mexico for there is no apparent reason why the
court should find any more rational a classification based on criteria
similar to compensation. In fact, since McGeehan was decided the
court has abolished interspousal tort immunity from ordinary negli66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-1-16 (Repl. 1966).
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-53-3 (Repl. 1968).
68. McGeehan, 88 N.M. at -307, 540 P.2d at 246. Justice Oman pointed out that New
Mexico still retained the common law doctrine of intra-family tort immunity and the duty
owed to invitees, licensees and trespassers. It should be noted that California at the time of
the Brown decision had airplane and motor boat guest statutes. Although the court recognized that the law treated similarly automobile, airplane and motor boat guests, it was
unable to see how these guests could reasonably be distinguished from guests in other
situations. 8 Cal. 3d at 865 n. 5,.506 P.2d at 219 n. 5, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n. 5.
69. This is the standard which Gunther's model establishes for measuring the rationality
of classifications challenged on equal protection grounds. Gunther's Model, supra note 27,
at 20.
70. Note, Guest Statutes and the Common Law Categories: An InseparableDuality? 51
Notre Dame Law. at 476. See also Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho at __, 523 P.2d at 1374
(dissenting opinion).
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gence7 1 and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 7 2 In both situations, without referring to the similar conclusions in the McGeehan
opinion, the court found these doctrines unjustified by existing circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision to invalidate the automobile guest statute may stand as a landmark case in the development of the law of New Mexico. In establishing the principle that
one should not have to pay for the right to a remedy for negligently
inflicted injury, the court has implied that other classifications similar to those drawn by the guest statute may be successfully challenged. The court's reliance on Brown v. Merlo makes the common
law categories of invitees, licensees, and trespassers particularly vulnerable. It may also suggest that the New Mexico court is willing to
take an activist stance in the area of tort reform similar to that which
characterizes the California Supreme Court.
The court's rejection of the traditional rationality test in favor of a
new model for equal protection analysis is also significant. The court
has demonstrated that it will judge the reasonableness of statutory
classifications in terms of changing circumstances. Furthermore, the
court shows that it is willing to intervene in state action when legislative means do not substantially further legislative ends or where the
rights adversely affected by the statute outweigh the state's interest
in accomplishing its goals.
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